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Abstract 
Using data from one of the Internet’s leading price comparison sites for consumer 
electronics products, we present evidence for the persistence of price dispersion for 
36 homogeneous products. The markets for these products are “thick” with an 
average of  over 20 firms selling each product. We show that prices do not converge 
to the “law of one price” even after an 18 month period. This finding is robust to 
controls for differences in shipping charges and inventories. Further, we show that 
product life cycle effects lead to changes in the number of competing firms and the 
range of price dispersion consistent with the theoretical predictions of the Varian 
(1980) model. The average number of competing firms declines from about 28 to 10 
during the final five months of our dataset. Over this same period, the average range 
in prices decreases from about 75 percent to 30 percent. After accounting for firm 
heterogeneities in costs, branding, reputation, trust, product availability and shipping 
costs, 28 percent of the variation in prices charged for homogeneous products remains 
unexplained. This is also consistent with the Varian model.  
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1.  Introduction 
The failure of the “law of one price” has been widely observed in non-Internet 
markets. In his seminal paper, Hal Varian quipped that when it came to prices for 
identical products in conventional retail markets, “… the ‘law of one price’ is no law 
at all.” (Varian 1980, 651) Beginning with Stigler (1961), a large and successful 
theoretical literature has arisen explaining how dispersed prices can comprise 
equilibrium in the presence of price-sensitive consumers and homogeneous products. 
One approach generates price dispersion in pure strategies, where different firms 
charge different prices because of heterogeneities in costs or service levels. The other 
approach generates price dispersion through randomized pricing strategies by firms.
1   
As Varian points out, the former type of price dispersion is unlikely to be long-lived, 
as consumers will eventually learn which firms are charging the best prices and shop 
from them exclusively. Varian argues that the latter type of price dispersion will 
persist over time.  
Price dispersion has also been observed in Internet markets (see Smith, Bailey, 
and Brynjolfsson, 1999 for a useful survey of results
2); however, little is known about 
the empirical persistence of this price dispersion over long periods of time. In contrast 
to Varian’s explanation, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) argue that price dispersion is 
largely due to retailer heterogeneity with respect to branding, awareness, and trust. If 
this is the case, price dispersion should be modest after controlling for such 
heterogeneities.   2 
The present paper examines the persistence of price dispersion in a well-
established online retail market. Using data collected over an 18-month period from 
one of the leading price comparison sites on the Internet, we show that prices for 
identical consumer electronics products listed by multiple retailers display 
considerable and persistent price dispersion. On average, the highest price for a 
consumer electronics product is 57% above the lowest available price. The savings to 
a consumer simply from consulting the comparison site are also significant—on 
average, the difference in prices paid by consumers shopping at a randomly selected 
firm rather than from the firm offering the lowest price is about $31. 
Price dispersion persists across products and across time. We find no convergence 
to the “law of one price” over an 18 month period even after controlling for 
differences in shipping charges and inventories.  We also use time variation in the 
data to make an additional inference. Specifically, we show that Varian’s model 
implies that as the reservation value of consumers seeking to purchase an item 
decreases, (1) the number of firms listing the product declines and (2) the range of 
prices offered decreases. The methodology we employ to test these predictions is to 
use the short life cycles of consumer electronics products as a means of obtaining 
variation in consumer reservation values. Reservation values are presumably lower 
later in the product lifespan. Empirically, we find evidence consistent with these 
hypotheses. The number of competing firms declines by over 60 percent in the final 
seven months of our dataset. Over this same period, the average range in prices 
decreases by $31 or 54% of the range at the start of the sample period.    3 
We find that even after controlling for differences in costs, reputation, awareness, 
and trust, a significant fraction of the observed price dispersion is unexplained. 
Specifically, regressions controlling for the presence of banner ads, consumer 
feedback ratings, firm disclosures about shipping costs, and inventory availability as 
proxies for these factors explain only about 17% of the observed dispersion in prices. 
Further, regressions using individual firm dummies and allowing the coefficients on 
these dummies to vary across multiple products offered by the same firm still leave 
28% of price dispersion unexplained.  
The nearest antecedent to this paper is Sorensen (2000).
3 Sorensen showed that 
there was considerable price dispersion in retail prescription drug markets in upstate 
New York. Moreover, this dispersion cannot be accounted entirely for by firm 
heterogeneities.
4 He finds that, consistent with equilibrium search models such as 
Burdett and Judd (1983), prescriptions that consumers purchase more frequently 
display less dispersion than those that are purchased less frequently. Our approach is 
similar in that we too seek to establish the empirical importance of price dispersion 
unaccounted for by firm heterogeneities. 
It is important to stress that our data comes from online markets where consumers 
have access to a list of prices. In this setting, information flows are “costless” inside 
the market. This suggests that models such as Varian (1980) or Baye and Morgan 
(2001) are probably more appropriate for generating testable implications for our data 
than models such as Reinganum (1979) or Burdett and Judd (1983) where equilibrium 
price dispersion stems from costly sequential or fixed-sample search.  4 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section derives three 
empirically testable implications of the Varian model. Section 3 describes our dataset, 
while Section 4 presents the analysis of the persistent price dispersion hypothesis. 
Section 5 examines the alternative hypothesis: that price dispersion is mainly due 
retailer heterogeneities. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Theory 
Unlike costly search models, which generate price dispersion from consumers’ 
positive search costs, the model of Varian postulates that I  “informed” consumers 
have access to the complete list of firm prices for some homogeneous product, as 
would be the case were these consumers to consult a price comparison site. The 
remaining consumers, perhaps unaware of the site or without Internet access, simply 
shop at a randomly selected firm and purchase from it if the price offered is less than 
the reservation value, r. There are M of these “uninformed” consumers in this market. 
All consumers have unit demand.  
Firms are assumed to be identical, there is free entry, and all firms have declining 
average cost curves.
5 We make the additional assumption that average cost curves are 
convex.
 6 Since firms pricing at the reservation price sell only to uninformed 
consumers at a price of r each, free entry implies that  
 
(1)  r = AC(M/n) 
  5 
where AC() is the average cost function of each firm and n is the equilibrium number 
of firms. Since average costs are declining, this implies: 
 
Hypothesis 1: As the reservation value decreases, the equilibrium number of firms 
declines.  
 
Intuitively, a shrinking reservation value reduces the overall surplus in the market. 
As a consequence, the market can support fewer firms’ fixed costs, and the 
equilibrium number of competing firms declines.  
Varian shows that in a symmetric equilibrium, prices are dispersed over the 
interval [p
*, r], where  
 
( 2 )       p
* = AC(M/n + I).  
 
The convexity of the average cost curves together with equilibrium conditions (1) and 
(2) implies: 
 
Hypothesis 2: As the reservation value decreases, the range in prices declines.  
 
The intuition for the decrease in the range in prices is as follows. As the 
reservation value decreases, the lowest price a firm is willing to charge if it is assured 
of attracting all shoppers declines, since the opportunity cost of this discount in terms  6 
of foregone revenue to loyal customers is reduced. This lowest price is p
* in equation 
(2) above. However, because of equilibrium exit, a larger fraction of a firm’s fixed 
costs are being covered by uninformed consumers; hence, the gains in terms of 
reduced average costs from selling to informed consumers is smaller when 
reservation values are lower than when they are higher. The upshot is that the range 
of prices offered is reduced under this circumstance.  
Finally, in Varian’s model, the symmetric equilibrium consists of all firms pricing 
according to an atomless cumulative distribution function over the range [p
*, r]. This 
implies: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Price dispersion for products will persist over time. 
 
In the sequel, we examine empirically these three hypotheses.  
 
3.  Data 
Tests of the above hypotheses require data from an environment where some 
consumers have access to the complete list of prices while others do not. Further, 
products sold must be fairly homogeneous and (for the symmetric equilibrium to be 
appropriate) the firms must have similar costs. While none of these conditions is 
likely to be exactly met in field data, Internet price comparison sites offer a 
reasonable approximation of these conditions. To this end, we assembled a dataset 
consisting of monthly price observations for 36 consumer electronics products offered  7 
for sale at the price comparison site Shopper.com for the period from November 1999 
through May 2001. Initially, we collected these data by saving web pages for each of 
the products listed.  After August 2000, we automated this process by constructing an 
Internet “spider” written in the PERL programming language to automatically 
download this information.  
The set of products in our dataset were selected because they were the 36 highest 
ranked products, in terms of popularity, at the Shopper.com site at the start of the 
study. We inferred that the markets for these products were likely to be thick on the 
consumer side. Thus, the incentives for sellers to balance between posting a high 
price to make higher margin sales to uninformed consumers versus selling at a low 
price to attract the informed consumers at Shopper.com were likely to be large. The 
product rankings given at Shopper.com are a function the number of unique consumer 
requests for either product or price comparison information from the Shopper.com 
site. This amounts to a “click through” from a general Shopper.com page to a specific 
product information page. 
 One potential problem in studying price dispersion on a product-by-product basis 
is that the relevant consumption component for consumers might be a bundle of 
products rather than an individual product. For two reasons, this problem is mitigated 
in our data. First, the products we study do not have obvious purchase 
complementarities. Indeed, many of the products listed in Table 5 (such as the Palm 
III, IIIx, and Palm V) are in fact substitutes. Second, the products we study are fairly 
expensive (averaging about $500), so consumers are unlikely to purchase multiple  8 
products at the same time in order to economize on shipping costs. This aspect of our 
data differs from earlier studies of less expensive items, such as books and CDs, 
where these effects might be more important.   
We grouped products into one of three broad categories: software, peripherals, 
and accessories. Software is self-explanatory. Peripherals were items that would 
typically be installed as part of an existing PC. Video boards are a representative item 
in this category. Finally, accessories are consumer electronics items that are usable 
with or without a PC. The Palm handheld is a typical item in this category. 
The cost structure of Shopper.com provides disincentives for dishonest or 
otherwise obfuscating pricing strategies.
7 A firm pays Shopper.com a fixed monthly 
fee plus an additional fee per “qualified lead” (defined as a click through by a 
consumer from the Shopper.com site to the merchant’s site). Thus, the strategy of 
posting a low price for a product which is unavailable in hopes of driving consumer 
traffic to one’s site does not come without cost. An additional concern is that 
merchants might choose to price discriminate between consumers coming to their 
website from Shopper.com and those accessing it directly. To deal with these issues, 
we conducted random audits of merchant listings. We found no obfuscation strategies 
being employed for the products we study nor did we find evidence of discriminatory 
pricing. Hence, we are confident that the prices listed on Shopper.com represent 
actual prices for actual products that can be obtained.
8 
There were a few instances of prices that were obviously inputted incorrectly by 
firms. Specifically, there were a couple of prices that were listed at $0 on the site. To  9 
deal with this issue, we dropped all prices of $5 or less from the sample. This 
eliminated six observations from the sample of 9,441 observations. Results presented 
below are robust to a variety of different approaches to “cleaning” the data.
9  
Figure 1 illustrates the information available to consumers searching for a 
particular product from Shopper.com's database. At the top of Figure 1, the product 
name, manufacturer name, manufacturer part number, list price, and the lowest price 
is listed. The information also includes, in tabular form, each firm’s name, the firm’s 
price, Cnet Certified Store status, Gomez merchant rating, state, telephone number, 
shipping cost, product availability, and the date on which the firm last updated its 
information. Consumers can sort the relevant information by clicking on the column 
header. For example, a consumer wanting to sort the firms by price can click on the 
price column header. 
Further product information and how to purchase an item from a particular firm 
can be obtained by ‘clicking’ either the “Buy info,” “firm name,” or “price” link.
10 
Consumers can access information about a firm’s return policies, acceptable methods 
of payment, delivery options, and other special features by clicking the “Company 
info” link below a firm’s name. Also, clicking the Certified Store logo brings up the 
requirements firms must meet in order to maintain its certified status. Finally, 
consumers can view the criteria on which a firm was evaluated and read the overall 
review by clicking on the stars from the Gomez.com firm review.  10 
<A> Branding, Reputation and Trust 
Shopper.com provides firms with other opportunities to distinguish themselves in 
the market. For an additional fee, a firm can complement its merchant name with its 
company logo or participate in a revolving targeted banner advertising campaign in 
several locations. 
Shopper.com provides two firm quality ratings with each product search. The first 
is the Cnet Certified Store rating. All firms displaying the Cnet Certified Store logo 
have met a set of seven criterion that include: providing Cnet with up-to-date pricing, 
shipping cost, and stock information; providing Cnet with a customer service policy; 
honoring prices displayed on the firm's web site; using encryption technology so all 
transactions are made in a secure environment; providing order confirmation within 
one business day of order and process orders promptly; providing professional 
packaging; and responding to customer service emails and phones call within two 
business days. It would seem that stores that are Cnet certified are likely to be 
perceived as more reputable than those who are not.  
Shopper.com also retains the services of an independent firm rating service. 
During the early part of our study, Shopper.com used Bizrate.com to survey 
consumers shopping experience with firms advertising on its web site and compiled 
ratings of the firms in several areas. An overall rating, between 1 and 5 stars (in half-
star increments) was assigned to each firm and displayed next to the firm's name. This 
allowed consumers to assess overall firm quality. Bizrate.com's services are provided 
for free to consumers and retail Internet firms. Bizrate.com provided these services  11 
for a fee to Shopper.com. In November, 2000, Shopper.com terminated its 
relationship with Bizrate.com.
11   
Firms may differ not only with respect to their use of banner ads, Cnet certified 
merchant status, and Bizrate ratings, but also with respect to their disclosure policies 
regarding shipping and inventory.  
In principle, all of these variables represent observable heterogeneities among 
firms. In Section 5, we examine how much of the observed price dispersion these 
heterogeneities explain. 
 
4.  Analysis 
<A> Summary of Price Variation 
Table 1 presents a list of prices for products offered in common by the four 
merchants covering the largest number of products in our dataset at the beginning of 
the dataset. The first column of the table lists the 27 products sold by all four firms on 
November 5, 1999. The type of product (S for software, P for peripherals, A for 
accessories) is listed in the second column. The last four columns show the listed 
price by the four firms on this date.  
The price dispersion observed for these products on this date is representative of 
the entire dataset. A consumer shopping for a digital camera, the Nikon Coolpix 950 
can save about $100 by simply buying from the lowest rather than the highest priced 
of these four merchants. Among these four firms, pcWonders offers the low price for 
24 out of the 27 products on this date. Interestingly, pcWonders is the high-price  12 
seller among the four for the remaining three products for which it lists a price. 
Likewise, there is no firm among the four that is the high price seller for all products, 
but McGlen Micro comes close—its price is the highest for 19 out of  the 27 
products. The remaining two sellers split second and third place fairly evenly. It is 
important to stress that none of these four firms consistently offers the lowest price 
across all products and time.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics of various measures of price dispersion for 
the entire period of the study. The results here confirm the impressions in Table 1—
price dispersion is a significant and persistent phenomenon in these markets. Table 2 
shows that the range in prices is $75.99 on average. The table also shows that a 
consumer shopping from the low price firm, rather than from a firm charging the 
average price, stands to save $30.70 on a purchase. Even a conservative measure of 
price dispersion, the difference between the two lowest listed prices, shows an 
average gap between these two prices of $8.52. The coefficient of variation—a unit-
free measure of price dispersion defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the 
mean—averages 12.6%. Thus, the price dispersion is substantial, although somewhat 




<B> Price Dispersion over Time 
In figures 2 through 4, we present evidence of persistent price dispersion over the 
18 month period covered in our dataset using three measures of price dispersion. Two  13 
of the measures, the coefficient of variation and range, were discussed earlier. In this 
case, the range in price is reported as a percentage of the lowest price offered for each 
product. The graph also shows the difference between the two lowest price listings, 
expressed as a percentage of the lowest listed price. This measure, which we shall 
refer to as the gap between the two lowest prices, is a very conservative measure of 
price dispersion. Moreover, it places no weight on high price outliers, which would 
affect the other two measures.
13  
In figure 2, we show the average level of price dispersion giving equal weight to 
each product date in our dataset over the 18 month period of our study. As the three 
panels of the figure show, there is persistent price dispersion using all three measures. 
Panel 2a displays the percentage gap over the 18 month period covered by our 
dataset. The percentage gap starts at around 5% and ends at slightly above this level. 
In between, the measure displays considerable volatility with upward spikes reaching 
over the 10% level in the middle of 2000 and the beginning of 2001. If anything, 
there is a slight upward trend in this measure.  
Panel 2b displays monthly percentage range figures. Unlike the percentage gap, 
this measure of price dispersion displays a distinct downward trend starting at 
between 70% and 80% and ending under 30% by May 2001. The trend in this 
measure of dispersion is consistent with the theoretical prediction of hypothesis 2 
derived in the previous section. Finally, panel 2c displays the coefficient of variation 
on a monthly basis. There is a slight downward trend in this measure of dispersion. At 
the start of our study, coefficient of variation averages around 13% whilst it falls to  14 
around 9% by the May 2001. Despite the downward trend displayed in the coefficient 
of variation and percentage range measures of price dispersion, prices are still 
significantly dispersed even after 18 months of price discovery by consumers and 
rival firms.  
The panels shown in figure 3 display the same three dispersion measures adjusted 
for shipping costs. While the prices used to compute the price dispersion measures in 
figure 2 and elsewhere are based on list prices, in figure 3 we adjust the prices for 
shipping and handling charges. Specifically, we divide the dataset into firms that 
report shipping and handling charges and those that do not. Of those firms that do 
report a shipping cost, if they suggest a range of prices, we take the midpoint of the 
range. Otherwise, we adjust the listed price for the shipping charge shown on the site 
and compute dispersion with these adjusted prices.  
It is theoretically possible to observe persistent dispersion in list prices, yet for all 
firms to be charging the same “full price” once one accounts for shipping costs. 
Figure 3, however, shows that this is not the case. Including shipping charges lowers 
the coefficient of variation, but typically by less than 1%. Shipping adjusted prices 
also lower the price range by less than 5% for each monthly period. Shipping adjusted 
prices have the least effect when one looks at the gap between the lowest two prices. 
Here, there is little to distinguish between dispersion using the adjusted and 
unadjusted prices.  
Figure 4 examines these same dispersion measures dividing firms into those that 
positively disclose that a particular item is in stock and those that do not. The idea is  15 
that firms that do not have an item in stock may list a price simply as a device to 
divert traffic to their site in hopes consumers will buy some other, presumably higher 
margin item. This could cause various measures of price dispersion to indicate 
dispersion even though all of the firms that actually have goods to sell charge the 
same price. As figure 4 shows, focusing solely on firms positively having the item in 
stock slightly decreases the coefficient of variation and range measures of price 
dispersion and does little to affect the gap measure. Regardless of the measure used, 
persistent price dispersion remains.  
To summarize, we find evidence of persistent price dispersion using a variety of 
dispersion measures and controlling for differences in shipping costs and whether the 
item is in stock. This is consistent with hypothesis 3.  
 
<C> Testing Comparative Static Implications 
We now turn to hypotheses 1 and 2, which predict that as reservation values 
decline, the equilibrium number of firms and the range in prices should both decline. 
Our data tracks 36 products over an 18 month period, starting at the point when they 
were the most popular products listed at Shopper.com. As products get older in our 
sample, one would expect consumer reservation values to decline. To get at this 
effect, we run the following regression: 
 
(3)   RANGEit = β 0 +β 1D1 + β 2D2 +β 3MSRPit + γ Xi +ε it. 
  16 
RANGEit is the range in prices for product i on date t expressed in dollars. D1 is a 
dummy for whether the observation comes six to ten months from the end of the 
dataset. D2 is a dummy for whether the observation comes from the last five months 
of the dataset. The variable MSRPit is the manufacturers suggested retail price for  
product i on date t. The vector Xi consists of dummies for the type of product 
(software, peripherals, or accessories). The idea behind these controls is that if 
demand or costs vary systematically with product type, this variation will be 
absorbed. 
  Using GLS to correct for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term, table 
3 presents the coefficient estimates for equation (3). The first column of the table 
displays the estimates of equation (3) when the dependent variable is simply the range 
in prices expressed in dollars. The coefficient associated with D1 is -4.576 indicating 
that the range in prices is compressed by about $4.58 within ten months of the end of 
the dataset. The compression in the range of prices approximately doubles to $12.59 
in the last five months of the dataset. Both coefficients are of the sign predicted in 
Hypothesis 1 and are significant at conventional levels. Moreover, both coefficients 
display the expected magnitudes—coefficient D1 is statistically significantly smaller 
than the D2 coefficient.  
  The second column of Table 3 displays the coefficients when we estimate the 
“corrected” range in prices using the procedure described in Sorensen (2000) to 
control for the effects of observable firm heterogeneities. Following Sorensen (2000), 
we estimate the range of the residuals from a fixed effects regression of price on  17 
product dummies and dummies for product type, certified merchant status, banner 
status, whether shipping cost and product availability were disclosed. The coefficient 
associated with the period from June to October 2000 indicates a compression of this 
“corrected” range measure of $11.86 while the coefficient for the final five months of 
the dataset shows compression of $19.28. Once again both coefficients are of the 
expected sign and significant. Also, the magnitudes of the coefficients are in the 
expected pattern; that is, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients D1 = D2 
against the one-sided alternative that D1 is smaller than D2. Taken together, the results 
are supportive of Hypothesis 1.   
Next, we examine the relationship between the age of the product and the number 
of listing firms. We do this by estimating the following regression: 
 
(4)  NUMFRMit = β 0 +β 1D1 + β 2D2 +β 3MSRPit + γ Xi +ε it, 
 
where NUMFRMit denotes the number of firms listing prices for product i on date t. 
Once again, we estimate this regression using GLS and correcting for 
heteroscedasticity. The estimated regression coefficients are reported in the third 
column of table 3. The number of competing firms declines by about 4.6 firms, as the 
coefficient on the dummy variable for the period June 2000 through October 2000 
indicates. Similarly, from November 2000 until the end of the dataset, the table shows 
that the number of firms further declines by about 13 firms. Both coefficients are of  18 
the expected signs and magnitudes and both are significant at conventional levels. 
Thus, the results of the fourth column of table 3 are consistent with hypothesis 2.  
Neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2, are made in isolation in Varian’s model. 
Indeed, that model predicts that changes in the range of prices and numbers of listing 
firms should be correlated with one another. This suggests that a more efficient  
estimation approach is to use Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to 
simultaneously estimate equations (3) and (4). The results of this approach are shown 
in Table 4. The first two columns of this table present the coefficient estimates using 
the raw dollar value of the range in prices. The second two columns present the 
coefficient estimates using the “corrected” price range using the residuals from the 
fixed effects regression described earlier.  
Once again, the coefficients on D1
 and D2 are of the expected signs and 
magnitudes and are significant at conventional levels. The correlation coefficient 
between these two variables is estimated to be 0.3783, which is positive and 
significant, again consistent with the theoretical predictions.  
 
5.  Firm Heterogeneity and Price Dispersion 
The analysis above indicates not only that price dispersion persists over time, but 
that the pattern of observed dispersion is consistent with predictions of the Varian 
model. In this section, we examine alternative explanations based on differences in 
branding, reputation, and trust as well as cost heterogeneities.   19 
For a given product listed at Shopper.com, all retailers are offering the same item. 
Yet, retailers do differ in their restocking policies, exchange policies, shipping 
speeds, and so on. Thus, it is possible that the observed price dispersion merely 
reflects quality differences among retailers, although the differences in the price 
rankings of the portfolio of products offered by the same retailer does cast some 
doubt on this explanation.  
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) identified branding, reputation, and product 
awareness as key factors in generating price dispersion on the Internet. To quantify 
the impact of these factors on the dispersion observed in our dataset, we consider the 
following model separately for each product in our dataset:  
 
(5) PRICEjt = β 0 + β 1CNETjt +β 2BANNERjt + β 3SHIPjt +β 4STOCKjt + ε jt 
 
As equation (5) shows, for each product, we regress the list price of firm j in 
period t on dummy variables for whether firm j is a Cnet certified merchant (the 
variable CNETjt), whether it posted a banner ad on that date (BANNERjt), whether it 
disclosed shipping costs on that date (SHIPjt), and whether it had the item in stock on 
that date (STOCKjt). The resulting R-squared values are reported in the first column 
of Table 5 (model 1).  
Notice that the R-squared values reported for model 1 represent the percentage of 
the total variation in the prices charged for each product that can be explained purely 
by observable differences in these firm characteristics. The R-squared values range  20 
from 2 percent to 100 percent. The average value is 17 percent, indicating that 83 
percent of the variation in the prices for these products cannot be explained by 
observable differences in firms’ reputations, advertising strategies, or disclosure 
policies regarding shipping costs or product availability. If price dispersion were an 
artifact purely of these observable differences, the R-squared values would all have 
been close to 1. 
Model 1 controls only for firm heterogeneities that are observable to consumers 
visiting the Shopper.com site. One might speculate that unobserved heterogeneities in 
firms’ costs or other factors explain the observed price dispersion. In order to quantify 
the impact on price dispersion of both observed and unobserved firm heterogeneities, 
we also regressed the list price of firm j in period t on dummy variables for each firm 
j. The R-squared values from this specification (model 2) are given in column 2 of 
table 5.  
The R-squared values reported for model 2 represent, for each product, the 
percentage of the total variation in prices explained by both firm differences 
observable by looking at the Shopper.com site as well as heterogeneities not directly 
observable (such as cost differences). Not surprisingly, including all of these dummy 
variables greatly increases the percentage of the observed price dispersion that can be 
explained. However, even with individual dummies for every firm in the sample and 
controls for each product in our sample, 28 percent of the dispersion in prices remains 
unexplained.   21 
To summarize, after accounting for firm heterogeneities in costs, branding, 
reputation, trust, product availability and shipping costs, 28 percent of the variation in 
prices charged for homogeneous products remains. This finding is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.  
 
6.  Discussion 
George Stigler noted that in practice there is never absolute homogeneity of 
commodities in naturally occurring markets. However, Stigler was loathe to attribute 
all of observed price dispersion to heterogeneities. He writes: “…a portion of the 
observed dispersion is presumably attributable to such [product] differences. But it 
would be metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion is due to 
heterogeneity.” (Stigler, 1961 p.214) 
The primary purpose of this paper is to assess whether a significant fraction of the 
price dispersion observed on a leading Internet price comparison site owes its 
existence to forces of persistent price dispersion hypothesized in Varian as opposed to 
being an artifact of differences in costs, branding, reputation, or trust among 
competing retailers. Our central finding is that price dispersion is remarkably 
persistent over the 18 month period of our study—even after controlling for shipping 
costs and firm heterogeneities. 
If temporal price dispersion, as hypothesized by Varian, is indeed an empirically 
important component of observed price dispersion, then an important implication of 
that model is that both the number of firms listing prices for a given product and the  22 
range of prices offered should decline as the product ages. We find evidence 
consistent with this prediction.  
Finally, we note that while a fraction of observed price dispersion may be 
explained by appealing to firm heterogeneities, 28 percent of the observed dispersion 
remains unexplained. We contend that this is further evidence in support of the 
empirical relevance of equilibrium models of persistent price dispersion.  
  23 
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Figure 1 Screenshot from Shopper.com 
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Figure 2: Raw Measures of Price Dispersion Over Time 
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Figure 3: Measures of Price Dispersion Controlling for Differences in Shipping 
 
Panel 3a: Percentage Gap of Firms Disclosing Full Price (List Price + Shipping Cost) Compared to 
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Panel 3b: Average Percentage Range of Prices for Firms Disclosing Full Price (List Price + Shipping 
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Panel 3c: Average Coefficient of Variation for Firms Disclosing Full Price (List Price + Shipping 
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Figure 4: Measures of Price Dispersion Controlling for Inventory Differences 
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Panel 4b: Average Percentage Range of Prices for Firms Disclosing Inventory Compared to Those 
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Table 1: Sample Prices Posted By Four Firms on November 5, 1999 
          
         
Product Type  AccessMicro.com  Computer411  McGlen  Micro  pcWonders.com 
3Com Homeconnect  P   $              120.42    $              131.40    $              128.42    $              115.89  
Adobe Acrobat V4.0  S                   210.42                    221.32                    218.42                    196.89  
ATX Motherboard  P                   134.98                    136.72                    150.95                    117.89  
Cassiopeia E-105  A                   530.73                    537.13                    534.73                    579.95  
Creative Labs 3d Blaster Riva TNT2 Ultra  P                   162.07                    164.95                    170.07                    146.89  
Creative Labs PC-DVD Encore 6x  P                   202.37                    199.95                    210.37                    183.95  
Creative Labs Video Blaster Webcam 3  P                     59.66                      64.95                      67.66                      53.89  
Diamond Viper V770 Ultra  P                   162.29                    151.95                    170.29                    149.89  
Epsonstylus Color 740  P                   194.19                    196.00                    202.19                    179.89  
Frontpage 2000  S                   122.65                    124.95                    130.65                    109.89  
Half Life  S                     33.47                      31.95                      39.00                      24.95  
HP CD-Writer Plus 8200i  P                   191.44                    194.95                    199.44                    185.89  
Intellimouse Explorer  P                     50.99                      63.23                      58.99                      45.89  
Money Deluxe 2000  S                     46.94                      49.95                      54.94                      44.89  
Matrox Millennium G400 Max  P                   200.29                    208.88                    208.29                    197.88  
Nikon Coolpix 950  A                   851.28                    879.52                    855.28                    786.95  
Olympus C-2000Z  A                   784.79                    779.95                    788.79                    698.89  
Olympus D-340R  A                   258.82                    264.95                    266.82                    298.95  
Pentium III 450 Chip  P                   189.95                    184.95                    209.95                    172.89  
Pentium III 500 Chip  P                   231.95                    229.95                    254.95                    224.89  
Palm III  A                   247.00                    219.95                    255.00                    189.89  
Palm IIIx  A                   330.00                    249.95                    338.00                    209.50  
Palm V  A                   381.95                    339.95                    389.95                    279.89  
Quicken Deluxe 2000  S                     45.25                      49.95                      53.25                      42.89  
Star Wars Episode I: Racer  S                     35.13                      35.55                      39.13                      27.95  
Star Wars X-Wing Alliance  S                     24.75                      23.95                      26.02                      31.95  
Virusscan Classic V4.0  S                     12.85                      13.95                      48.57                       9.95  
  33 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Dispersion Measures 
     
     Selected Percentiles 
  Average Std. 
Dev. 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
Absolute Measures of Price 
Dispersion 
 
        
Range in Prices   $75.99   $97.1  $6.12 $21.89 $38.70  $89.05  $312.17 
        
Difference Between 
Average and Lowest Price  
         30.70   39.3  2.60 8.78 15.36  36.32  107.61 
        
Gap (Difference) Between 
Lowest Two Prices 
           8.52   22.6  0.00 0.20 1.94  6.25  40.80 
        
Relative Measures of Price Dispersion 
 
     
Range in Prices (as a 
percentage of lowest price) 
57.1%   52.8%  7.6% 24.4% 42.7% 67.0%  176.4% 
        
Coefficient of Variation             12.6   9.0  3.6 6.8 9.7  15.6  32.5 
        
Gap Between Lowest Two 
Prices (as a percentage of 
lowest price) 
            6.2   12.8  0.0 0.2 2.0  6.3  28.6 
Difference Between 
Average and Lowest Price 
(as a percentage of lowest 
price) 
           21.8   18.5  3.5 10.1 17.4  26.9  59.2 
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Table 3: Product Life Cycle and Range of Prices 
   
    
    
  Range in Prices  Range in 
Residuals 
Number of Firms 
    
Jun 00 to Oct 00  -4.576 -11.859  -4.623 
 (2.310) (1.907) (1.072) 
    
Nov 00 to May 01  -12.585 -19.282  -12.957 
 (2.361) (1.973) (1.079) 
    
MSRP 0.237 -0.008  0.003 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.003) 
    
Software -12.004 -0.939  -3.73 
 (2.509) (2.242) (1.278) 
    
Accessories -6.078 -10.021  -10.908 
 (3.624) (2.178) (1.290) 
    
Constant 18.959 73.42  29.274 
 (2.930) (2.39) (1.364) 
    
Number of 
Observations 
427 427 427 
Log Likelihood  -2057.902 -1841.891  -1638.909 
    
GLS estimates with heteroscedastic error structure across panels.  
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.      
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Table 4: Product Life Cycle, Range of Prices, and Number of Firms 
    
      
      
  Range in Prices Number of 
Firms 
Range in Residuals  Number of 
Firms 
      
Jun 00 to Oct 00  -21.608 -8.041  -15.345  -8.041 
 (6.722) (0.997)  (1.801)  (0.997) 
      
Nov 00 to May 01  -30.569 -18.08  -25.588  -18.08 
 (7.340) (1.089)  (1.967)  (1.089) 
      
MSRP 0.337 0.031  0.124  0.031 
 (0.022) (0.003)  (0.020)  (0.003) 
      
Software -17.747 -20.872  67.147  -20.872 
 (24.039) (3.565)  (17.619) (3.565) 
      
Accessories -16.246 -0.946  74.045  -0.946 
 (17.083) (2.533)  (14.528) (2.533) 
      
Constant 21.112 29.964  -15.980  29.964 
 (14.426) (2.139)  (17.451) (2.139) 
      
Number of 
Observations 




0.6773 0.6772 0.5385  0.6772 
    
SUR estimates.     
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.     
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Table 5: Percentage of Price Dispersion Explained by Observable and 
Unobservable Firm Heterogeneities 
 
    
  Model 1 Model 2
Product Name  R
2  R
2 
3Com Homeconnect  0.03 0.59
Adobe Acrobat V4.0  0.08 0.63
Adobe Photoshop V5.0.2  0.91 0.98
ATX Motherboard  0.02 0.70
Cassiopeia E-105  0.04 0.58
Creative Labs 3d Blaster Riva TNT2 Ultra  0.06 0.83
Creative Labs Blaster CDRW 4224  0.13 1.00
Creative Labs CDRW 6424  0.13 0.92
Creative Labs PC-DVD Encore 6x  0.05 0.85
Creative Labs PC-DVD RAM 5.2gb SCSI-2  0.08 0.47
Creative Labs Sound Blaster Live Value  0.26 0.79
Creative Labs Video Blaster Webcam 3  0.13 0.50
Diamond Viper V770 Ultra  0.02 0.75
Epsonstylus Color 740  0.07 0.44
Frontpage 2000  0.08 0.64
Half Life  0.10 0.95
HP CD-Writer Plus 8200i  0.08 0.76
Intellimouse Explorer  0.04 0.66
Intel Create & Share Camera Pack USB  0.99 1.00
Money Deluxe 2000  0.04 0.84
Matrox Millennium G400 Max  0.07 0.61
Nikon Coolpix 950  0.10 0.61
Official Red Hat Linux V6.0  0.17 0.78
Olympus C-2000Z  0.25 0.85
Olympus D-340R  0.17 0.82
Paint Shop Pro V5.0  0.03 0.53
Pentium III 450 Chip  0.18 0.79
Pentium III 500 Chip  0.17 0.51
Palm III  0.05 0.73
Palm IIIx  0.12 0.56
Palm V  0.07 0.55
Quicken Deluxe 2000  0.03 0.76
Star Wars Episode I: Racer  0.13 0.48
Star Wars X-Wing Alliance  0.26 0.69
Upgrade Windows 98  1.00 1.00
Virusscan Classic V4.0  0.02 0.73
    
Average 0.17  0.72  37 
 
Endnotes 
                                                           
1 Typical of the first approach are Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Reinganum (1979), and 
Spulber (1995). Typical of the second approach are Shilony (1977), Rosenthal (1980), 
Varian (1980), Narasimhan (1988), Baye and Morgan (2001), and Baye and Morgan 
(forthcoming). Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Moraga (2000) combine both approaches.  
2 See also Brynjolfsson and Smith (1999), Stahl (2000),  and Bakos (2001). 
3 Our paper is also in the spirit of Villas-Boas (1995), who looks at prices for coffee and 
saltine crackers and examines whether the empirical distribution of prices is consistent 
with the theoretical distribution induced by Varian’s model. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 
(2001, 2002a,b) also examine comparative static implications of mixed strategy models 
of price dispersion using data from Internet price comparison sites. 
4 See Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) and Carlson and Pescatrice (1980) for additional 
studies of price dispersion in conventional retail markets. See Brynjolfsson and Smith 
(2000) and Scholten and Smith (2002) for a studies comparing conventional retail 
markets and Internet markets.  
5 Shapiro and Varian (1999) argue that declining average cost curves are characteristic of 
many aspects of Internet markets.  
6 Shapiro and Varian (1999) argue that cost curves consisting of a fixed cost and a 
constant (and low) marginal cost characterize many online markets. This type of cost 
function satisfies the convexity assumption.  38 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Ellison and Ellison (2000) find considerable evidence of the use of obfuscation 
strategies in selling memory on a rival price comparison site.  
8 Of course, the listed price is not the final price that a consumer pays for the item. This 
final price will typically include shipping and handling charges and possibly tax 
depending on the state in which the consumer resides. Both of these costs are variable 
depending on the bundle of items purchased by the consumer and his state of residence. 
Thus, we treat the listed price as the relevant price. Calculations of price dispersion where 
we assume consumers buy only a single item, do not live in the state where the retailer is 
located, and use the information about shipping costs available on the Shopper.com site 
to calculate the final purchase price do not lead to qualitatively different results regarding 
price dispersion nor are the magnitudes of the observed dispersion much affected. See 
figure 3 for some evidence on this. 
9 While we have 9,441 individual price observations, our unit of observation in examining 
summary statistics of price dispersion is the product-date. This pools all price 
observations for a given product on a given date. There are 427 product-dates in our 
dataset.  
10 Each firm's web site also provides consumers with different information. Some firms 
include a photograph and detailed description of the product offered for sale, while others 
list only the price and shipping information. 
11 On December 20, 2000, Cnet announced that Gomez.com would serve as its new, 
independent rating services. This ranking is similar to Bizrate.com, with the exception  39 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that Gomez.com's overall rating systems are based on a 3-star scheme in full-star 
increments. 
12 As a basis for comparison, Sorensen observes a coefficient of variation of 22% in retail 
prescription drugs markets.  
13 See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2001) for a discussion of the theoretical rationale for 
using the gap measure of price dispersion. Some other researchers use the trimmed range 
to deal with outliers. Note, however, that the trimmed range has the undesirable property 
of dropping low-priced outliers, which presumably get a large volume of sales.  